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I.  Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (“Brussels I Recast 
Regulation”) and its Mild Opening to Third-
Country-Related Disputes  
The Proposal submitted by the European Commission on 14 December 2010 for 
the recast of EC Regulation No. 44/2001 (“Brussels I Regulation”) presented, 
among its distinctive features, a deviation from the traditional inter partes 
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approach to jurisdiction, which is a salient feature of both the Regulation and the 
pre-existing Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968.1 
In fact, the distribution of jurisdiction among the courts of the various 
Member States, as established first under the Brussels Convention and developed 
subsequently under the Brussels I Regulation, is based on the assumption that only 
the jurisdiction of Member States’ courts is addressed by the rules contained in 
these instruments. Such an assumption appears inevitable, due to the inapplicabil-
ity, to third countries, of rules contained either in treaties, such as the Brussels 
Convention, or acts adopted by the EU institutions, such as the Brussels I Regula-
tion. Besides, the assumption underlying the distribution of jurisdiction among 
Member States’ courts as embodied in both the Brussels Convention and Regula-
tion is that the rules contained in either instrument should in principle only address 
disputes presenting a relevant connection with the EU legal order. The said rele-
vant connection is identified, as a general rule, in the defendant being domiciled in 
a Member State, even though, by virtue of the interplay of alternative rules, juris-
diction is eventually vested in the courts of a different Member State.2 The general 
relevance of the domicile of the defendant in a Member State as a ground for the 
application of the rules of jurisdiction contained in either instrument is nonetheless 
subject to exceptions within the framework of the Brussels I Regulation, namely in 
case an exclusive head of jurisdiction is applicable, since those could apply 
irrespective of the domicile of the defendant. The rationale of the exception lies in 
the assumption that the localisation of the ground for exclusive jurisdiction in a 
Member State constitutes by itself a sufficient connection to the sphere of the 
Member State in order to justify the application of the rules as contained in either 
the Convention or the Regulation.3 
                                                          
1 COM(2010) 748 final, of 14 December 2010; revised version COM(2010) 748 
final/2, of 3 January 2011. See in this respect, among others, A. BORRÁS, Application of the 
Brussels I Regulation to External Situations: From Studies Carried Out by the European 
Group for Private International Law (EGPIL/GEDIP) to the Proposal for the Revision of the 
Regulation, YPIL 2010, p. 333 et seq.; B. HESS, The Brussels I Regulation: Recent Case 
Law of the Court of Justice and the Commission’s Proposed Recast, Common Market Law 
Review 2012, p. 1075 et seq., esp. p. 1105 et seq.; R. HAUSMANN , The Scope of Application 
of the Brussels I Regulation, in F. POCAR/ I. VIARENGO/ F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting 
Brussels I, Padua 2012, p. 3 et seq., esp. p. 21 et seq.; R. LUZZATTO, On the Proposed Appli-
cation of Jurisdictional Criteria of Brussels I Regulation to Non-Domiciled Defendants, 
ibidem, p. 111 et seq.; F. POCAR, Révision de Bruxelles I et ordre juridique international: 
quelle approche uniforme?, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc. 2011, p. 591 et seq.;  
J. WEBER, Universal Jurisdiction and Third States in the Reform of the Brussels I 
Regulation, RabelsZ 2011, p. 619 et seq. 
2 The general relevance of the domicile of the defendant as a ground triggering the 
application of the jurisdiction rules as contained in the Regulation can be desumed from the 
interplay of Articles 2 and 4 of the Brussels I Regulation, as from the corresponding provi-
sions of the Brussels Convention of 1968: see, among others, L. MARI, Il diritto processuale 
civile della Convenzione di Bruxelles I, Il Sistema della competenza, Padua 1999, p. 129 et 
seq.; Th. KRUGER, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and Their Impact on Third States, 
Oxford 2008, p. 59 et seq. 
3 See, e.g., on the capability of the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction to establish by 
themselves a sufficient connection between the dispute and the legal order of the Member 
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The system is nonetheless awkward in its application since it compels the 
courts in the Member States to apply two parallel sets of rules with respect to juris-
diction over actions falling within the material scope of application of the Brussels 
Convention first and then the Brussels I Regulation, subject to whether or not the 
defendant was domiciled in a Member State. Therefore, since the presentation of a 
proposal in 2006 for the amendment of the parallel Brussels II-bis Regulation 
concerning jurisdiction in matrimonial matters,4 the European Commission has 
studied solutions to overcome the said difficulty, by providing for residual juris-
dictional rules intended to regulate, uniformly and without reference to domestic 
rules, jurisdiction in those cases where the defendant is not domiciled in a Member 
State.5 This solution has been incorporated namely in Regulation No. 4/2009 in 
matters of maintenance obligations6 as well as in Regulation No. 650/2012 in 
matters of succession.7 The two Regulations, in fact, provide in very similar terms 
for residual jurisdiction rules, introducing supplementary grounds of jurisdiction to 
be applied in order to establish the jurisdiction of a Member State court whenever 
the defendant is not domiciled in the EU, coupled, as a last resort, with a provision 
for a forum necessitatis. The latter provides for the jurisdiction of the courts of a 
Member State having a sufficient connection with the dispute whenever the parties 
are unable to bring their case before the courts of a third country with which the 
case would otherwise be connected.8 
                                                          
States concerned, D.P. FERNANDEZ ARROYO, Exorbitant and Exclusive Grounds of 
Jurisdiction in European Private International Law: Will They Ever Survive?, in Festschrift 
für Erik Jayme, Vol. I, München 2004, p. 169 et seq.  
4 COM(2006) 399 final, of 17 July 2006, Article 7. The proposal was subsequently 
set aside and replaced by the establishment of an enhanced cooperation in order to complete 
the rules as contained in the said regulation with provisions concerning applicable law, as 
contained in Regulation (EU) No. 1259/2010 (“Rome III Regulation”). See A. FIORINI, 
Harmonizing the Law Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation – Enhanced Cooperation 
as the Way Forward?, I.C.L.Q. 2010, p. 1143 et seq. 
5 See, for a discussion of the solution advanced in the said proposal by the European 
Commission, A. BONOMI, Sull’opportunità e le possibili modalità di una regolamentazione 
comunitaria della competenza giurisdizionale applicabile erga omnes, Riv. dir. int. priv. 
proc. 2007, p. 313 et seq.  
6 See Articles 6-7 of Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009, on jurisdiction, applicable law, 
recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters of maintenance 
obligations. 
7 See Articles 10-11 of Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012, on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic 
instruments in matters of succession and on the establishment of a European Certificate of 
Succession. 
8 See with regard to the introduction of a provision on forum necessitatis in 
Regulation (EC) No. 4/2009 on maintenance obligations, among others, P. FRANZINA, Sul 
forum necessitatis nello spazio giudiziario europeo, Riv. dir. int. 2009, p. 1121 et seq.;  
G. ROSSOLILLO, Forum necessitatis e flessibilità dei criteri di giurisdizione nel diritto inter-
nazionale privato nazionale e dell’Unione europea, Cuadernos de derecho transnacional 
2010, No. 1, p. 403 et seq., esp. p. 413 et seq.; concerning the corresponding provision 
introduced in Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 in matters of succession, A. DAVÌ/  
A. ZANOBETTI, Il nuovo diritto internazionale privato delle successioni nell’Unione europea, 
Fabrizio Marongiu Buonaiuti 
 
Yearbook of Private International Law, Volume 15 (2013/2014) 90 
The proposal for a recast of the Brussels I Regulation submitted by the 
European Commission in December 2010 advanced a solution following the same 
pattern,9 but no consensus was reached within the Council and the European Parlia-
ment regarding the solution proposed, since a more conservative position prevailed 
in both instances.10 Substantively, the distribution of jurisdiction of the Brussels I 
Recast is very much on the same lines as that contained in the existing Brussels I 
Regulation, thus maintaining in principle the distinction between cases in which 
the defendant is domiciled in the EU and cases in which the defendant is domiciled 
in a third country. The latter cases continue to be governed by domestic rules of 
jurisdiction. The only mild opening to the erga omnes approach advocated by the 
Commission in its proposal which has been retained in the rules of jurisdiction as 
contained in the Recast Regulation consists of the availability of protective rules of 
jurisdiction. These protective rules are available to consumers and employed 
workers as against non-EU domiciled counter-parties. Furthermore, the Recast 
Regulation provides for the applicability of the rules concerning choice-of-court 
agreements to those designating Member States courts irrespective of the domicile 
of either party. By contrast, the corresponding rules as contained in Brussels I 
required at least one of the parties to be domiciled in a Member State.11 
                                                          
Cuadernos de derecho transnacional 2013, No. 2, p. 5 et seq., esp. p. 119 et seq.; the rules 
on forum necessitatis as contained in both Regulations appear inspired by the model offered 
by domestic provisions, such as Article 3 of the Swiss Federal Private International Law Act 
(LDIP). See S. OTHENIN-GIRARD, Quelques observations sur le for de necessité en droit 
international privé suisse, RSDIE 1999, p. 251 et seq. See also Article 11 of the Belgian 
Code of Private International Law and J.-Y. CARLIER, Le Code belge de droit international 
privé, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 2005, p. 11 et seq.; esp. p. 22 et seq. For a broader comparative 
overview, see V. RÉTORNAZ/ B. VOLDERS, Le for de nécessité: tableau comparative et 
évolutif, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 2008, p. 225 et seq. 
9 See Articles 25-26 of the Commission Proposal, COM(2010) 748 final, on which 
we may refer to F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La tutela del diritto di accesso alla giustizia e 
della parità delle armi tra i litiganti nella proposta di revisione del regolamento n. 44/2001, 
in A. DI STEFANO/ R. SAPIENZA, La tutela dei diritti umani e il diritto internazionale (XVI 
Convegno SIDI, Catania, 23-24 giugno 2011), Naples 2012, p. 345 et seq., esp. p. 355 et 
seq. 
10 See the General Approach adopted by the Ministers of Justice sitting in the 
Council on 1 June 2012, doc. No. 10609/12, JUSTCIV 209, CODEC 1495, Article 4-bis and 
the Opinion Delivered by the European Parliament on 20 November 2012, doc. Pt_TA-
PROV(2012)11-20, PE 495.880, Article 6. 
11 See, among others, on the solutions finally retained in Regulation (EU)  
No. 1215/2012 (“Brussels I-bis Regulation” or “Brussels I Recast Regulation”) in respect of 
jurisdiction in situations connected to third countries, among others, J.-P. BERAUDO, Regards 
sur le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I sur la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et 
l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale, Clunet 2013, p. 741 et seq., esp. 
p. 746 et seq.; F. CADET, Le nouveau règlement Bruxelles I ou l’itinéraire d’un enfant gaté, 
ibidem, p. 765 et seq., esp. p. 772 et seq.;  
H. GAUDEMET-TALLON/ C. KESSEDJIAN, La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I,  
Rev. trim. droit eur. 2013, p. 435 et seq., esp. p. 439 et seq.;  
A. LEANDRO, Prime osservazioni sul regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 (“Bruxelles I bis”),  
Il giusto processo civile 2013, p. 583 et seq., esp. p. 594 et seq.; P.A. NIELSEN, The New 
Brussels I Regulation, Common Market Law Review 2013, p. 503 et seq., esp. p. 512 et seq.; 
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II. Taking into Account Parallel Proceedings Pending 
before Third Country Courts: Justification for the 
Innovation Introduced by the Recast Regulation  
With respect to the rules on lis alibi pendens and related actions, the attitude re-
garding their subjective scope of application has been different from the start, that 
is, already within the text of the 1968 Brussels Convention. In fact, these rules 
were conceived within the original architecture of the Brussels Convention to 
complement the rules regarding mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments 
as among the Member States of the then European (Economic) Community. They 
were clearly conceived to prevent the risk of conflicting decisions being handed 
down by courts in different Member States, a circumstance which could easily be 
identified as an obstacle to the achievement of the objective of mutual recognition. 
Accordingly, since the objective of mutual recognition of judgments as among the 
Member States was to be achieved irrespective of the domicile of either of the 
parties to the dispute, the aim of preventing the occurrence of conflicting or 
irreconcilable judgments was clearly pursued to the same extent. Therefore, the 
rules on lis alibi pendens and related actions, as contained in the Brussels Conven-
tion first and then in the Brussels Regulation, are meant to apply irrespective of 
any subjective requirement of connection of the parties to the Member States, since 
the circumstance of the proceedings being actually pending before the courts of 
different Member States is the sole decisive element in this respect.12 
Nonetheless, the possible involvement of third country courts alongside 
Member States’ courts with respect to the same dispute or related disputes cannot 
be disregarded if we accept the applicability of the said rules of coordination 
among proceedings pending before courts of different Member States to actions 
allegedly implying also third-country related parties or material elements of the 
case. This possibility was envisaged from the start by the Brussels Convention of 
1968 which, in a provision that appears in the same terms in Regulation Brussels I, 
as well as in the Recast Regulation, provides for the refusal of recognition of a 
judgment delivered by the courts of another Member State in case of conflict with 
a judgment previously delivered in a third country on the same dispute and 
between the same parties, provided the said third-country judgment can be 
recognised in the Member State concerned.13 
                                                          
A. NUYTS, La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 2013, p. 1 et seq., esp. 
p. 4 et seq. 
12 The point has been stressed already with regard to the rules on lis alibi pendens as 
contained in the Brussels Convention of 1968 by the ECJ, 27 June 1991, C-351/89, 
Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. et al. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., ECR [1991] I-3317 
et seq., paras 13 et seq. For further references, see F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Lis Alibi 
Pendens and Related Actions in Civil and Commercial Matters Within the European Judicial 
Area, YPIL 2009, p. 511 et seq., esp. p. 519 et seq. 
13 See the rules as contained, respectively, in Article 27 No. 5 of the Brussels 
Convention of 1968, as introduced by the Accession Convention of 1978; in Article 34 No. 
4 of Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 (“Brussels I Regulation”) and in Article 45 (1)(d) of 
Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (“Brussels I Recast Regulation”).  
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Accordingly, just as the occurrence of the delivery of conflicting judgments 
by the courts of different Member States is to be prevented by means of the rules 
on lis alibi pendens and related actions, a corresponding need exists with respect to 
third country courts, which may be concurrently seized of actions regarding either 
the same dispute pending before the courts of a Member State or a related dispute. 
This is precisely the aim of the innovation introduced by the Recast Regulation, 
which purports to remedy the lack of coordination with the recognition rules in the 
Brussels I Regulation by expressly regulating, under Articles 33 and 34 respec-
tively, the occurrence of the presence of actions on the same dispute or related 
actions pending before the courts of third countries.14 The Recast Regulation does 
not, however, regulate the recognition in the Member States of judgments 
delivered by third country courts which, following the same lines of the existing 
Brussels I Regulation, remain subject to individual Member States’ rules on the 
recognition of foreign judgments or, eventually, to any applicable international 
convention. In this respect, it might be considered that the Recast Regulation has 
given rise to a situation of asymmetry between the territorial reach of its rules 
concerning coordination among competing jurisdictions, which now extend to 
situations where third country courts are involved, and its rules concerning the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, which remain confined to the intra-EU 
domain. A corresponding asymmetry is, accordingly, to be noted with respect to 
the impact of the rules contained in the Recast Regulation on domestic rules 
regarding either aspect. In fact, whereas the application of domestic rules on the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments remains unprejudiced in respect 
of judgments delivered by third country courts, the new rules contained in Articles 
33 and 34 of the Regulation will have a destructive effect on domestic rules 
concerning lis alibi pendens and related actions pending before foreign courts, a 
consequence which could be considered as unwarranted since in most cases those 
rules are already capable of ensuring comparable effects in terms of coordination 
with the jurisdiction of third country courts and prevention of conflicting 
judgments.15  
Before addressing the manner in which the rules as introduced in the Recast 
Regulation purport to achieve the desired aim of coordination with the courts of 
third countries, it is to be observed that the said aim is not pursued in respect of any 
                                                          
14 The innovation was already present within the proposal for a recast of the Brussels 
I Regulation submitted by the European Commission in December 2010. The proposal, 
nonetheless, provided only for a rule in respect of lis alibi pendens before third country 
courts, without taking into consideration related actions pending before such courts: see 
COM(2010) 748 final, Article 34. We commented on the solution advanced by the proposal 
in this respect in F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, La disciplina della litispendenza nei rapporti tra 
giudici di paesi membri e giudici di paesi terzi nella proposta di revisione del regolamento n. 
44/2001, Riv. dir. int. 2011, p. 496 et seq. See also L. FUMAGALLI, Lis Alibi Pendens. The 
Rules on Parallel Proceedings in the Reform of the Brussels I Regulation, in F. POCAR/  
I. VIARENGO/ F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I, Padua 2012, p. 237 et seq., esp.  
p. 249 et seq. 
15 This aspect of the introduction of the new rules will be examined infra, par. VI, 
discussing the residual role of domestic rules on lis alibi pendens and related actions 
pending before foreign courts.  
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action falling within the material scope of application of the Regulation itself. 
Instead, the application of both provisions is limited to those cases in which the 
court seized in a Member State is neither vested with exclusive jurisdiction (on a 
ground directly established by the Regulation or pursuant to a choice of court 
agreement), nor with jurisdiction pursuant to the special rules of jurisdiction estab-
lished by the Regulation for matters presenting the need to protect weaker parties. 
The said limitation marks a difference from the ordinary rules on lis alibi pendens 
and related actions as among courts of different Member States. These rules apply 
irrespective of the ground on which the jurisdiction of the seized courts is based, 
with the sole exception, introduced by the Recast Regulation, of the second seized 
court being vested with exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to a choice of court agree-
ment. In that case, nonetheless, the application of the rule on lis alibi pendens is 
not excluded altogether, though it differs substantially in terms of its mode of oper-
ation.16 The exclusion of the application of the rules on lis alibi pendens and related 
actions vis-à-vis the courts of third countries in the said cases is to be considered as 
due to the need to ensure respect for the exclusive jurisdiction of Member States 
courts granted by the Regulation directly or by the will of the parties. It also 
complies with the allocation of jurisdiction specifically devised by the Regulation 
for weak-party relationships, in respect of which third country courts are not sub-
ject to comparable rules of jurisdiction nor to any duty to accept the jurisdiction of 
Member States courts as exclusive or the relevant allocation as mandatory.17 
Nonetheless, a problem of coordination arises with respect to the above-
mentioned provision, which still appears under Article 45(1)(d) of the Recast 
Regulation, whereby recognition of a judgment delivered by a Member State court 
                                                          
16 See Article 31(2) of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012, which provides for a 
substantial reversal of the rule on lis alibi pendens in such a case, so that any other court 
sitting in another Member State shall stay its proceedings until the designated court has 
declared whether it will exercise jurisdiction pursuant to the choice of court agreement. The 
said exception to the rule on lis alibi pendens has been introduced in order to overcome the 
apparent obstacle to the effectiveness of a choice of court agreement inherent in the func-
tioning of the rules on lis alibi pendens, whereby the court designated in the agreement 
would have been compelled to stay its proceedings if a court sitting in another Member State 
had been seized first, until that court – which would have been vested with the competence 
to assess the validity and applicability of the choice of court agreement – had declined juris-
diction, as stressed by the ECJ, 9 December 2003, C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT 
Srl, ECR [2003] I-14693 et seq. The solution maintained by the ECJ in that case has been 
criticised especially by jurists from common law jurisdictions: see in particular T.C. 
HARTLEY, Choice-of-court Agreements, Lis Pendens, Human Rights and the Realities of 
International Business: Reflections on the Gasser Case, in Le droit international privé: 
esprit et methods, Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul Lagarde, Paris 2005, p. 383 et seq.;  
L. MERRETT, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements Within the Brussels Regime, 
I.C.L.Q. 2006, p. 315 et seq.; R. FENTIMAN, Parallel Proceedings and Jurisdiction Agree-
ments in Europe, in P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area,  Oxford-Portland/ Oregon 2007, p. 27 et seq.  
17 This is probably a shortcoming which is inherent in the unilateral mode of operat-
ing of the coordination with the jurisdiction exercised by third country courts introduced by 
the provisions under consideration, which are deemed to operate beyond any reciprocity, as 
correctly observed by L. FUMAGALLI (note 14), at 249. 
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in another Member State may be refused if the judgment is in conflict with an 
earlier judgment delivered by a third country court between the same parties and 
concerning the same cause of action, which is eligible for recognition in the 
Member State concerned. In fact, the said rule, which the Recast Regulation has 
maintained unchanged from the text of the existing Brussels I Regulation, applies 
regardless of the basis for jurisdiction of the Member State court that handed down 
the judgment to be recognised. Consequently, whereas the exercise of jurisdiction 
by a Member State court under one of the heads concerned may not be precluded 
by the existence of a parallel action pending before the courts of a third country, 
the recognition of a judgment delivered by that court under such a head of jurisdic-
tion in the other Member States could be precluded by a judgment delivered in the 
meantime by a court sitting in a third country even if, hypothetically, the latter had 
been seized later than the Member State court. 
 
 
 
III. Discretion as a Distinctive Feature of the Rules 
Concerning lis alibi pendens and Related Actions 
before Third Country Courts  
We move now to an analysis of the mode of operation of the rules regarding lis 
alibi pendens and related actions in the relationships with third country courts. The 
most salient feature of these rules as compared to the rigid approach which inspires 
the corresponding rules regarding the same relationships among the courts of dif-
ferent Member States is the broad discretion which they confer on Member States’ 
courts in respect of the appropriateness of applying them in the individual case.18 
Particularly striking in this respect is the difference in approach between the 
rules addressing the two situations of lis alibi pendens. In fact, the application of 
the rules of lis pendens as among the courts of different Member States is manda-
tory. This implies, first, that the Member States’ courts have a duty to apply those 
rules ex officio. Secondly, they are obliged to stay the proceedings pending before 
them and dismiss the case once the relevant grounds are met. Conversely, the 
application of the rules of lis pendens with respect to proceedings pending before 
third country courts is left to the discretion of the Member State court seized. 
Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast Regulation firstly leave it to the domestic law of 
the Member State of the court seized to determine whether the courts are to apply 
the rule ex officio, failing which both rules are to be intended as applicable only ex 
                                                          
18 This is probably the most striking feature of the innovation introduced by the 
Recast Regulation, which has been frequently underlined in the first commentaries: cf., 
particularly, L. FUMAGALLI (note 14), at 249 et seq., and, among general comments on the 
Recast Regulation as a whole, J.-P. BERAUDO (note 11), at 753 et seq.; F. CADET (note 11), 
at 775 et seq.; H. GAUDEMET-TALLON/ C. KESSEDJIAN (note 11), at 442 et seq.; A. LEANDRO 
(note 11), at 603 et seq.; P.A. NIELSEN (note 11), at 513 et seq.; A. NUYTS (note 11), at 7 et 
seq. The inherently flexible nature of the instrument of coordination with the jurisdiction of 
third country courts is underlined also in the Preamble to the Recast Regulation, Recital  
No. 23.  
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parte.19 Secondly, the courts seized in the Member States are under no duty to stay 
proceedings in favour of a third country court, even when the requirements estab-
lished by the rule are met. Inevitably, this difference is less sensible with respect to 
related actions, where also the rules regarding the relationships among Member 
States’ courts provide for a discretionary evaluation by the court second seized. 
This is justified in light of the different contexts and the different perspectives in 
which the two sets of rules operate. 
In fact, whereas among the Member States the relevant context is that of the 
European Judicial Area within which the automatic recognition of judgments is the 
general rule and where, due to the significant innovations introduced in this respect 
by the Recast Regulation itself, judgments delivered in a Member State are, subject 
to certain conditions, directly enforceable in the other Member States without need 
for any declaration of enforceability (exequatur),20 the context is not the same with 
respect to actions pending before third country courts.21 Accordingly, the perspec-
tive from which the Regulation operates, consisting of a distribution of jurisdiction 
within a closely integrated system sharing common values and traditions and, cru-
cially, common standards of procedural fairness, cannot be extended to the rela-
tionships with third countries. In terms of the latter, the perspective from which the 
innovation introduced by the Recast Regulation moves is that of a unilateral effort 
                                                          
19 See, respectively, Article 33(4) of the Recast Regulation in respect of lis alibi 
pendens and Article 34(4) concerning related actions. See infra, VI, concerning the residual 
role of the domestic rules on lis alibi pendens and related actions in the relationships with 
third countries.  
20 This is probably the most significant innovation introduced by the Recast 
Regulation since it extends to all judgments in civil and commercial matters, falling within 
the material scope of application of the Regulation, a solution strictly inspired, albeit with 
some modifications, to that previously introduced, in respect of judgments on non-contested 
claims, in Regulation (EC) No. 805/2004 on the establishment of a European enforcement 
order. See for an analysis of the new regime introduced by the Recast Regulation in this 
respect, among others, J.-P. BERAUDO (note 11), at 756 et seq.; F. CADET (note 11), at 770  
et seq.; H. GAUDEMET-TALLON/ C. KESSEDJIAN (note 11), at 451 et seq.; A. LEANDRO (note 
11), at 610 et seq.; P.A. NIELSEN (note 11), at 524 et seq.; A. NUYTS (note 11), at 22 et seq.; 
with regard to the solutions, from which the final text of the Regulation slightly departed, 
advanced in the proposal submitted by the European Commission, Th. PFEIFFER, Recast of 
the Brussels I Regulation: The Abolition of Exequatur, in F. POCAR/ I. VIARENGO/  
F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I, Padua 2012, p. 311 et seq.; M. DE CRISTOFARO, 
The Abolition of Exequatur Proceedings: Speeding up the Free Movement of Judgments 
while Preserving the Rights of the Defense, ibidem, p. 353 et seq. See also, concerning the 
latter aspect, F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 9), at 361 et seq.   
21 As noted already (supra II.), the Recast Regulation, following the same approach 
as the current Brussels I Regulation, regulates only the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments delivered by Member States’ courts, whereas the recognition of judgments 
delivered by third country courts is left to the domestic law of the Member States or to 
international conventions as may be applicable to the relationships between the individual 
Member State and the third country concerned. See, on the opportunity to provide for 
common rules regarding the recognition in the Member States of judgments delivered by 
third country courts, S.M. CARBONE, What About the Recognition of Third States’ Foreign 
Judgments?, in F. POCAR/ I. VIARENGO/ F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I, Padua 
2012, p. 299 et seq., esp. p. 301 et seq. 
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of coordination with the jurisdiction of third country courts, which is attempted 
independently from any condition of reciprocity and towards third countries 
belonging to various legal traditions. Within the much broader context in which the 
rules attempting the said unilateral effort of coordination are deemed to operate, it 
is clearly impossible to place a comparable degree of reliance on the likelihood of 
the proceedings pending before a third country court to end up with a judgment 
capable of recognition in the Member State of the court seized as would apply in 
intra-EU cases.22 
This justifies the express provision in both Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast 
Regulation of a requirement for granting a stay of the proceedings pending before a 
Member State court which is frequently present within domestic rules concerning 
lis alibi pendens or related actions before foreign courts, whereby the court is to 
establish that the judgment to be delivered by the third country court concurrently 
seized of the same or of a related action is capable of being recognised in the 
Member State of the court seized.23 Such an assessment, which substantially 
                                                          
22 In substance, in the relationships with the courts of third countries it proves diffi-
cult to establish a principle of reciprocal faith, which is distinctive of the European judicial 
area as a space where judges of a Member State may entrust those sitting in the other 
Member States to deliver judgments capable of being recognised and enforced in the other 
Member States and to correctly apply the same set of rules concerning jurisdiction. The 
principle of reciprocal faith has been used on various occasions by the ECJ to stress the need 
for Member States’ courts to respect the determinations made by other Member States’ 
courts regarding jurisdiction: in particular, ECJ, 9 December 2003, C-116/02, Erich Gasser 
GmbH v. MISAT Srl (note 16), concerning the competence to decide on the validity of a 
jurisdiction agreement designating a court of another Member State; ECJ, 27 April 2004, 
case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, ECR [2004] I-3565 et seq., concerning the exclusion of the 
power to issue anti-suit injunctions which could have the effect of preventing a judge sitting 
in another Member State from exercising his jurisdiction; ECJ, 10 February 2009, Allianz 
S.p.a. c. West Tankers Inc., ECR [2009] I-663 et seq., extending the same solution to a case 
where the injunction had been issued to enforce an arbitration clause.  
23 Such a requirement is present, among others, under Italian law, under Article 7 of 
law No. 218/1995 providing for the reform of the Italian system of private international law: 
see, among others, C. CONSOLO, Profili della litispendenza internazionale, Riv. dir. int. 
1997, p. 5 et seq., esp. p. 38 et seq.; R. MARENGO, La litispendenza internazionale, Turin, 
2000, p. 98 et seq.; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Litispendenza e connessione internazionale. 
Strumenti di coordinamento tra giurisdizioni statali in material civile, Naples 2008, p. 34 et 
seq., p. 399 et seq. In French Law, see the judgment of the French Cour de cassation, 1re Ch. 
Civ., 26 November 1974, Soc. Miniera di Fragne; annotated by A. PONSARD, Clunet 1975, 
p. 108 et seq.; annotated by D. HOLLEAUX, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1975, p. 491 et seq. In 
German law, see judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof, 2 October 1957, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift (NJW) 1958, p. 103 et seq. and R.A. SCHÜTZE, Die Berücksichtigung der 
Rechtshängigkeit eines ausländischen Verfahrens, NJW 1963, p. 1486 et seq. In Austrian 
law, see the case law of the Oberster Gerichtshof (OGH), among which OGH, 23 February 
1982, Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung (ZfRV) 1984, p. 145 et seq.; annotated by  
A. KONECNY, Zur Einrede der Streitanhängigkeit, ibidem; OGH, 12 February 1997, IPRax 
1999, p. 385 et seq.; annotated by B. HEIDERHOFF, Widerklage und ausländische Streitan-
hängigkeit, IPRax 1999, p. 392 et seq. In Swiss Law, see Article 9 of the Swiss federal law 
on private international law (LDIP) and I. SCHWANDER, Ausländische Rechtshängigkeit 
nach IPR-Gesetz und Lugano-Übereinkommen, in Beiträge zum schweizerischen und inter-
nationalen Zivilprozessrecht. Festschrift für Oscar Vogel, Freiburg (CH) 1991, p. 395  
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consists of a forecast, a prognostic evaluation as significantly conveyed by the 
German expression Anerkennungsprognose, is to be performed on the basis of the 
domestic rules on recognition of foreign judgments, due to the inapplicability to 
third-country judgments of the rules contained in the Regulation. Due to its prog-
nostic nature, the said assessment inevitably implies a certain degree of discretion, 
alongside an inevitable margin of uncertainty, by the judge. In fact, subject to the 
peculiarities of the relevant domestic rules, such an evaluation is inherently incom-
plete. Actually, some of the elements to be taken into consideration are present 
already at the moment when the assessment takes place, such as those regarding 
the jurisdiction of the foreign court and the regularity of the introductory phase of 
the proceedings. Others are inevitably to be appreciated by inference from the 
circumstances of the case as they appear at the moment when the evaluation is 
performed. Accordingly, the assessment regarding the latter may eventually be 
rebutted based on subsequent developments and by the judgment to be delivered by 
the foreign court. Among these, feature the compatibility of the judgment to be 
delivered by the third country court with the public policy of the Member State of 
the court seized; the capacity of the judgment to become final and, where applica-
ble, to acquire the force of res iudicata in the country of origin; and finally, 
reflecting the most commonly contemplated grounds of recognition, the absence of 
any conflict with judgments to be delivered in the Member State of the court seized 
– excluding the judgment to be delivered by the court seized in the proceedings 
concerned, which, due to the stay granted, will certainly not be delivered earlier 
than the foreign judgment – or with judgments enforceable in the same country.24  
If the requirement just mentioned is not novel to the regulation of lis alibi 
pendens before foreign courts at a domestic level, as it finds its justification from a 
systematic perspective in the attitude of lis pendens to promote a coordination 
among competing jurisdictions, paving the way for the recognition of the judgment 
to be delivered by the foreign court seized of the concurrent action, more peculiar 
is the second requirement of Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast Regulation. In fact, 
the requirement that the granting of a stay is necessary for the proper administra-
tion of justice appears more strictly inspired, in its broadly discretionary nature, to 
a different technique of coordination among competing jurisdictions, which is 
inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Such a doctrine, which is famil-
iar uniquely to common law countries, is based on an exercise of self-restraint by 
the court seized of an action. Such self-restraint presupposes that the action, though 
                                                          
et seq. In Belgian law, see Article 14 of the Belgian code of private international law and  
J.-Y. CARLIER (note 8), at 25.  
24 The inevitable prognostic and incomplete nature of the assessment to be per-
formed by the judge regarding the likelihood of the proceedings pending abroad to result in 
a judgment capable of recognition in the forum at the stage when the judge is expected to 
decide on the granting of a stay due to lis alibi pendens has been historically a ground for 
resistance from a systematic perspective to the attribution of effects to the mere fact of 
proceedings pending abroad, since this would have caused a significant element of uncer-
tainty: see, in particular, G. MORELLI, Diritto processuale civile internazionale, II ed., Padua 
1954, p. 169 et seq., who pointed to this shortcoming in order to justify the negative attitude 
towards lis alibi pendens in respect of proceedings pending abroad adopted at that time 
under Italian law, pursuant to Article 3, Code of civil procedure.   
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falling within the limits of the court’s jurisdiction, nonetheless appears weakly 
linked to the forum. At the same time, the application of the doctrine presupposes 
that the action presents stronger connections with another country, in whose courts, 
on an overall assessment of the relevant circumstances, it would be likely to be 
entertained more appropriately than in the forum. The decision to grant a stay of an 
action on the grounds of forum non conveniens is generally made subject to a fur-
ther condition, which is the same as that contemplated by the Recast Regulation for 
the purposes of granting a stay of an action on grounds of lis alibi pendens or of a 
related action pending before a third country court. The court is to be satisfied that 
the granting of a stay is necessary for the correct administration of justice.25 
Such a requirement, which is inevitably discretionary in nature, is strictly 
due to the need to ensure that the decision to grant a stay of an action pending 
before the court of a Member State based on the presence of a parallel action 
pending before the court of a third country does not endanger the right of the appli-
cant to obtain a fair trial. Such a right could be jeopardized not only by the wait 
until the end of proceedings pending before the third country court concurrently 
seized, but also, particularly in case of lis alibi pendens where the same action is 
pending abroad, by a lack of familiarity by the defendant of procedure in the third 
country court, which may provide less satisfactory standards of procedural fairness 
than those generally available in a Member State court. The requirement under 
examination is to be evaluated carefully by the Member State courts, since a deci-
sion to stay proceedings pending before them in order to give way to a concurrent 
action pending before a third country court could entail a responsibility for the 
Member State whose courts exercised their discretion recklessly. In such a situa-
tion, in fact, a Member State could face the risk of being held liable for having 
violated the provisions under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights as well as under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
which applies to action taken by a Member State court pursuant to a provision 
contained in a EU Regulation,26 in case the third country court appears unable to 
                                                          
25 The requirements to which the granting of a stay on forum non conveniens 
grounds is subject have been clearly specified, under English law, by the well-known House 
of Lords judgment in the case of Spiliada Maritime Corporation v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] 
A.C. 460 et seq., esp. p. 475. Literature on the said doctrine is particularly extensive: we 
may refer, among others, to Ch. CHALAS, L’exercice discrétionnaire de la compétence 
juridictionnelle en droit international privé, Aix-Marseille 2000, p. 220 et seq.; M.A. LUPOI, 
Conflitti transnazionali di giurisdizioni, Milano 2002, p. 145 et seq., esp. p. 167 et seq.; 
A. NUYTS, L’exception de forum non conveniens (Etude de droit international privé 
comparé), Bruxelles 2003, p. 183 et seq. The doctrine has also formed the subject of a reso-
lution adopted by the INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, Le recours à la doctrine du forum 
non conveniens et aux « anti-suit injunctions »: principes directeurs/ The Principles for 
Determining When the Use of the Doctrine of forum non conveniens and Anti-Suit 
Injunctions is Appropriate, Annuaire de l’Institut de droit international vol. 70-I (2003), p. 1 
et seq.; A. NUYTS, Les principes directeurs de l’Institut de droit international sur le recours à 
la doctrine du forum non conveniens et aux antisuit injunctions, Revue belge de droit inter-
national 2003, p. 536 et seq. 
26 Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, the latter applies to the institutions of the EU and to Member States only insofar as 
they are implementing provisions of EU law: see, among others, A. ROSAS/ H. KAILA, 
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secure satisfactory standards of fair trial as established pursuant to those provisions 
according to their interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights.27 
 
 
 
IV. Grounds for Resuming Proceedings as a Safeguard 
for the Procedural Rights of the Parties 
It is in light of the risk inherent in the exercise of such a discretion that both provi-
sions under Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast Regulation provide for exceptional 
circumstances under which a Member State court having stayed proceedings due to 
lis alibi pendens or to a related action pending before a third country court may 
decide to resume proceedings without waiting for the proceedings pending before 
that court to have come to an end. The said exceptional grounds for resuming pro-
ceedings broadly correspond, in negative and alternative terms, to the requirements 
allowing, cumulatively, for the granting of a stay, and, inherently, they imply in 
turn the exercise of a certain degree of discretion on the part of the Member State 
court seized. The Member State court having stayed proceedings may, in fact, 
discretionally decide to resume proceedings in a series of circumstances in which, 
on different grounds, the third country court seized of the concurrent action no 
longer appears to be in a position to grant an effective, timely and fair handling of 
the case pending before it. This may in turn occur either due to the fact that the 
third country court stayed or discontinued the proceedings pending before it, or 
                                                          
L’application de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne par la Cour de 
justice: un premier bilan, Il diritto dell’Unione europea 2011, p. 1 et seq.; J. ZILLER, I diritti 
fondamentali tra tradizioni costituzionali e “costituzionalizzazione” della Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione europea, ibidem, p. 539 et seq. 
27 We discussed this issue in F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI, Forum non conveniens e  
art. 6 della convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Riv. dir. int. 2001, p. 420 et seq, 
commenting on the House of Lords judgment in the case of Lubbe and ors. v. Cape Plc., 
[2000] UKHL 41, where the House of Lords excluded the possibility of granting a stay on 
forum non conveniens grounds when, due to the absence of measures of legal aid compara-
ble to those available before the English courts, the applicants would not be in a position to 
entertain proceedings before the allegedly more appropriate court. More broadly, on the 
relevance of a correct establishment of jurisdiction for the right of the parties to obtain a fair 
trial, among others, J.J. FAWCETT, The Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private 
International Law”, I.C.L.Q. 2007, p. 1 et seq.; A. HALFMEIER, Menschenrechte und interna-
tionales Privatrecht im Kontext der Globalisierung, RabelsZ 2004, p. 653 et seq.;  
P. KINSCH, Droits de l’homme, droits fondamentaux et droit international privé, Recueil des 
Cours vol. 318 (2005), p. 9 et seq., esp. p. 65 et seq.; F. MARCHADIER, Les objectives 
généraux du droit international privé à l’épreuve de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme, Bruxelles 2007, p. 183 et seq.; P. SCHLOSSER, Jurisdiction in International 
Litigation: The Issue of Human Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels 
Convention, Riv. dir. int. 1991, p. 5 et seq. 
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that the third court appeared unable to deliver a timely judgment on the merits, or, 
more generally, due to the need to ensure the correct administration of justice.28 
Again, whereas the first ground contemplated for a resumption of proceed-
ings by the Member State court, albeit subject to its discretionary evaluation, is 
linked to objective circumstances of fact, such as the proceedings before the third 
country court having materially been stayed or discontinued, the others imply a 
much broader degree of discretion. In particular, the appearance of the third coun-
try court being unable to conclude its proceedings in a timely manner introduces an 
element which, though relevant within the context of the guarantee of a fair trial 
pursuant to both Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, has been considered by 
the European Court of Justice as alien to the logic of the rules on lis alibi pendens 
as contained formerly in the Brussels Convention of 1968 and then in the Brussels 
I Regulation.29 Although the principle of mutual faith among the judicial systems of 
the Member States has precluded the attribution of relevance to that factor, the 
difference in treatment between proceedings pending before Member State courts 
and third country courts appears unwarranted. As it is well known, from case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and domestic legislation passed to remedy 
the situation, lengthy proceedings are certainly not an exclusive prerogative of 
third country courts.30  
Oddly, whereas one of the requirements for granting a stay of proceedings 
is the appearance that the third country court is likely to deliver a judgment capable 
of recognition in the Member State of the court seized, the subsequent appearance 
to the contrary due to the emergence of new elements is not contemplated as a 
ground for resuming proceedings. Such a situation may, nonetheless, be considered 
as likely to fall under the catch-all provision allowing for the resumption of pro-
ceedings in order to ensure the correct administration of justice.  
Symmetry is instead to be found with respect to the additional requirements 
for granting a stay and resuming proceedings in case of a related action pending 
                                                          
28 See, respectively, Art. 33(2) of the Recast Regulation in respect of lis alibi 
pendens before a third country court and Art. 34, par. 2 of the same Regulation in respect of 
related actions pending before such a court. 
29 ECJ, Gasser (note 16), at paras 70 et seq. See, among others, J.J. FAWCETT (note 
27), at 13 et seq.; R. FENTIMAN, Access to Justice and Parallel Proceedings in Europe, 
Cambridge Law Journal 2005, p. 312 et seq.; T.C. HARTLEY (note 16), at 389 et seq.;  
Th. SCHILLING, Internationale Rechtshängigkeit vs. Entscheidung binnen angemessener 
Frist. Zum Zusammenspiel von Art. 6 I EMRK, Art. 307 EGV und Art. 27 EuGVV, IPRax 
2004, p. 294 et seq. 
30 Most notably, in Italy such a problem has become so significant, after a long series 
of judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights affirming the violation of 
the rule under Article 6(1) of the ECHR due to the excessive length of proceedings before 
the Italian courts, to cause the passing of a law providing for compensation to the parties 
aggrieved by such violations: law No. 89 of 24 March 2001, so called “legge Pinto” from 
the name of its promoter. See, concerning its interpretation by the Italian Court of Cassation, 
M.L. PADELLETTI, Le sezioni unite correggono la rotta: verso un’interpretazione della legge 
Pinto conforme alle decisioni della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, Riv. dir. int. 2004, p. 
452 et seq.  
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before a third country court under Article 34 of the Recast Regulation. In this case, 
in fact, since the appropriateness of a joint hearing and decision of the related 
causes in order to prevent the risk of irreconcilable decisions figures among the 
requirements for the granting of a stay of proceedings pending before a Member 
State court, the subsequent appearance that such a risk is not material any longer is 
contemplated among the alternative grounds for the resumption of proceedings. 
Nonetheless, it seems that this requirement, which appears in precisely the same 
terms for related actions pending before other Member States’ courts under Article 
30(3) of the Recast Regulation31 pertains to the mere existence of the requirements 
for the concurrent actions to be considered as related for the purposes of the rule 
under consideration, and not to the distinct level of the appropriateness of a stay to 
be granted when a related action is pending before a third country court. Further-
more, whereas, in the context of intra-EU relationships, the granting of a stay of an 
action due to a related action pending before another Member State’s courts is a 
prelude to a consolidation of the actions before the court first seized, provided the 
further requirements established in this respect are met, such a perspective is more 
difficult to achieve with regard to related actions pending before third country 
courts. A provision in this sense could hardly be unilaterally adopted in an EU act, 
which by definition cannot be binding on third countries. Therefore, the stay of 
proceedings due to a related action pending before a third country court as 
conceived under Article 34 of the Recast Regulation can hardly be considered as 
likely to ensure a joint hearing and decision of the related causes, whereas it could 
more modestly be held to allow the Member State court seized to wait for the third 
country court to decide on the related cause in order to take account of the judg-
ment delivered in its respect for the purpose of deciding on the action pending in 
the forum.32 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 The same terms appeared in the corresponding provisions of Article 28(3) of the 
Brussels I Regulation as well as, earlier, in Article 22(3) the 1968 Brussels Convention. 
32 In fact, the consequences likely to derive from the granting of a stay of proceed-
ings pending before a Member State court due to a related action pending before a third 
country court are to be considered as quite similar to those deriving from the application of 
analogous provisions contained in Member States’ laws, such as Article 7(3) of Law  
No. 218/1995 providing for the reform of the Italian system of private international law, 
which provides for a discretionary power of the seized court to suspend proceedings in case 
of an action concerning a preliminary issue pending before a foreign court. The purpose of 
the rule is clearly that of waiting for the preliminary issue to be decided by the foreign court 
in order to take account of the decision delivered, provided the latter meets the requirements 
for recognition, for the adjudication of the action pending in the forum. See, among others, 
C. CONSOLO (note 23), at 67 et seq.; R. MARENGO, (note 23), at 132;  
F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 481 et seq. 
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V. Effects of the Judgment Delivered by the Third 
Country Court in the Same or in a Related Action 
on the Proceedings Pending before the Member 
State Court 
The last point addressed brings us to the discussion of a critical element of the new 
rules concerning lis alibi pendens and related actions in the relationships with third 
country courts. This consists of the effects produced by the judgment delivered by 
the court seized in a third country on the action pending before the Member State 
court having stayed proceedings.33 
In this respect, the difference in approach as compared to the solutions 
adopted for intra-EU cases under Articles 29 and 30 of the Recast Regulation is 
significant, and cannot but reflect the difference between the contexts in which the 
two sets of rules are intended to operate. In fact, whereas in the intra-EU context, 
sufficient reliance may be placed on the assumption that the proceedings pending 
before the court of another Member State which has affirmed its jurisdiction will 
end up with a judgment entitled to recognition and enforceable in the Member 
State of the second seized court, the same is not true in respect of the relationships 
with third country courts. With respect to proceedings pending before such courts, 
no reliance can be placed on the possibility of the judgment to be delivered by the 
court seized in a third country to be recognised or enforced in the Member State of 
the concurrently seized court, nor, as mentioned already, on the possibility for the 
applicant in the proceedings before the Member State court to have his cause 
consolidated with that pending on a related action before a third country court. This 
different state of affairs, which was underlined since the very beginning by 
subjecting the granting of a stay due to proceedings pending before a third country 
court to the requirement of a positive Anerkennungsprognose, turns into a radically 
more restrictive regulation of the effects ensuing from the granting of a stay of the 
proceedings. In fact, under both Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast Regulation, the 
proceedings in respect of which a stay has been granted shall remain suspended – 
unless they are resumed under one of the grounds examined above – for the entire 
duration of the proceedings pending before the third country court.34 The Member 
                                                          
33 See, respectively, Article 33(3) of the Recast Regulation in respect of lis alibi 
pendens before a third country court and Article 34(3), in respect of related actions pending 
before such a court. 
34 The solution retained by the Recast Regulation in this respect is similar to that 
adopted in some domestic rules concerning lis pendens before a foreign court, where, 
accordingly, no reliance may be placed on the proceedings pending abroad to end up with a 
judgment amenable to recognition in the forum. See, with regard to Art. 7 of law  
No. 218/1995, providing for the reform of the Italian system of private international law,  
A. DI BLASE, Influenza della Convenzione di Bruxelles sulla disciplina della litispendenza 
nella legge di riforma del diritto internazionale privato italiano, in F. SALERNO (ed.), 
Convenzioni internazionali e legge di riforma del diritto internazionale privato, Padua 1997, 
p. 195 et seq., esp. p. 196 et seq.; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 504 et seq.; 
concerning Art. 9(3) of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law, among others, 
B. DUTOIT, Commentaire de la loi fédérale du 18 décembre 1987, 2nd edn, Bâle 1997, p. 19 
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State court having stayed the proceedings pending before it is allowed, or rather, in 
case of lis pendens, obliged to decline jurisdiction only once the proceedings 
before the third country court have been concluded with a judgment which can be 
recognised and, eventually, enforced in the Member State of the court seized. The 
particularly cautious approach adopted in this respect by the Recast Regulation 
inevitably confirms, if need be, the scarce reliance which may be placed on the 
prognostic evaluation performed by the Member State court upon deciding on the 
granting of a stay in respect of the likelihood of the proceedings pending before the 
third country court to end up with an enforceable judgment.  
As for the difference between the regime respectively applicable to situa-
tions of lis alibi pendens and of related actions pending before a third country 
court, the solution adopted by the Recast Regulation appears reasonable in provid-
ing for a duty of the Member State court to decline jurisdiction in the former case 
and for a mere discretion in the latter. In fact, in case of lis pendens the two actions 
pending respectively before a Member State court and before a court sitting in a 
third country are assumed to be identical, albeit with the flexibility which the ECJ 
has adopted in interpreting the relevant requirements in respect of intra-EU cases.35 
Accordingly, the judgment delivered by the third country court, once recognised in 
the Member State of the concurrently seized court, is likely to fully absorb the 
object of the action which has been introduced before that court. Instead, in case of 
related actions, the objects of the concurrent actions are by definition not the same, 
except, of course, in case the applicant in the action pending before the Member 
State court seized has succeeded in having his action consolidated with that pend-
ing before the third country court. Therefore, the Member State court must be left 
with the necessary discretion in order to be able to assess the extent to which the 
judgment delivered by the third country court is capable, once recognised, to 
absorb the subject-matter of the action introduced before the Member State court or 
whether, conversely, an interest persists in the resumption of proceedings before 
that court in order to proceed with the case on the basis of the judgment delivered 
by the third country court on the related action.36 
                                                          
et seq.; P. VOLKEN, Kommentierung zu Art. 9, in Zürcher Kommentar zum IPRG, 2nd edn, 
Zürich 2004, p. 111 et seq., esp. p. 127 et seq.  
35 See, particularly, in respect of the requirement of the identity of the causes of 
action of the concurring proceedings, ECJ, 8 December 1987, case 144/86, Gubisch 
Maschinenfabrik v. Palumbo, ECR [1987], 4861 et seq.; ECJ, 6 December 1994, C-406/02, 
Tatry (Owners of the cargo lately laden on board the ship) v. Maciej Rataj (Owners of the 
ship), ECR [1994] I-5439 et seq., both concerning cases of actions for negative declarations 
as opposed to actions seeking the enforcement of a contract or the establishment of liability 
for damages; ECJ, 19 May 1998, C-351/96, Druot assurances S.A. v. Consolidated 
Metallurgical Industries, ECR [1998] I-3075 et seq., concerning the requirement of the 
identity of the parties. We may refer, among others, to A. DI BLASE, Connessione e 
litispendenza nella Convenzione di Bruxelles, Padua 1993, p. 83 et seq.; F. MARONGIU 
BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 291 et seq.; idem (note 12), at 528 et seq.; C. MCLACHLAN, Lis 
pendens in International Litigation, Leiden/ Boston 2009, p. 117 et seq.  
36 An interest in the resumption of the proceedings stayed by the Member State court 
will subsist whenever the action pending before that court is dependent from the result of the 
action which has formed the subject of the proceedings pending before the third country 
court, in case the latter concerned a preliminary issue to be decided beforehand, as 
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VI. Residual Role of Domestic Rules on lis alibi 
pendens and Related Actions before Foreign 
Courts  
The introduction within the Recast Regulation of uniform rules addressing the 
situation where the same or related actions are pending before the courts of third 
countries provides an answer to a question which has been left open by the 
Brussels I Regulation and which has never been addressed expressly by the ECJ, 
that is, the applicability by Member State courts of domestic rules on lis alibi 
pendens or related actions pending before foreign courts to cases where the parallel 
proceedings are pending before third country courts. 
This issue could apparently be easily disposed of by observing that since the 
rules on lis pendens and related actions as contained in the Brussels I Regulation 
applied only in respect of actions bending before other Member States’ courts, no 
apparent obstacle existed to the applicability of domestic rules to a situation which 
the Regulation, just as previously the Brussels Convention of 1968, did not intend 
to regulate.37 Nonetheless, the point proved controversial as a consequence of the 
position adopted by the ECJ in its case law related to both the Convention and the 
Regulation. In the said case law, in fact, the ECJ has developed the assumption that 
jurisdiction conferred upon the courts of a Member State by the provisions of the 
Brussels I Regulation or the Brussels Convention alike is to be considered as man-
datory, so that the courts of a Member State vested with such a jurisdiction are not 
allowed to decline it in favour of third country courts applying their domestic 
rules.38 
                                                          
contemplated under Italian law by Article 7(3) of Law No. 218/1995: see, among others,  
C. CONSOLO (note 23), at 67 et seq.; R. MARENGO (note 23), at 132; F. MARONGIU 
BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 481 et seq.  
37 Such has been the solution defended by the English Court of Appeal in the well-
known judgment in the case of In Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd., [1992] Ch. 72, and finds 
support also in the opinion of one of the first scholars addressing comprehensively the sys-
tem established by the Brussels Convention of 1968: G.A.L. DROZ, Compétence judiciaire 
et effets des jugements dans le Marché commun, Paris 1972, p. 198 et seq., who admitted 
that courts sitting in Member States whose laws contemplated a lis alibi pendens rule in 
respect of proceedings pending before a foreign court could apply those rules in the relation-
ships with third countries, so as to achieve the same objective of sound administration of 
justice which the Convention pursued as among the Member States. Perplexities were 
nonetheless raised by the cited judgment of the English Court of Appeal, insofar as it 
admitted the possibility of granting a stay on forum non conveniens grounds, due to the 
element of discretion which this would have introduced in a system based on rigid rules, 
whose application was aimed to ensure certainty and predictability: see, in particular,  
H. DUINTJER TEBBENS, The English Court of Appeal in Re Harrords: An Unwelcome 
Interpretation of the Brussels Convention, in M. SUMAMPOUW (ed.), Law and Reality, Essays 
on National and International Procedural Law in Honour of C.C.A. Voskuil, The Hague 
1992, p. 47 et seq.; H. GAUDEMET-TALLON, Le “forum non conveniens”, une menace pour la 
convention de Bruxelles?, Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 1991, p. 491 et seq.   
38 The applicability of the rules of jurisdiction as contained, at the relevant time, in 
the Brussels Convention of 1968 on the sole ground of the domicile of the defendant in a 
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Such a position, which can be considered as dictated by the logic of effet 
utile, whereby in having recourse to domestic rules to settle matters not expressly 
regulated by provisions of EU law, the Member States may not prejudice the 
attainment of the objective of EU rules applicable in the field concerned,39 has been 
clearly maintained in the well-known Owusu case. The said case dealt with the 
application of a mechanism inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
which does not find a direct parallel within the system of the Brussels I Regula-
tion.40 Nonetheless, it has been questioned whether the negative solution adopted 
by the Court could also extend to the applicability of other instruments, more 
homogeneous to those contemplated at an intra-EU level within the Regulation 
itself, by means of which Member States’ courts could be brought to decline juris-
diction in favour of third country courts.41 In this sense, the English Court of 
Appeal, not long after the ECJ judgment in the Owusu case, has maintained that the 
latter was of no prejudice to the power of the English courts to decline jurisdiction 
in a case subject to the Brussels I Regulation due to a choice of court clause 
designating a third country court, with due account taken of the weight attached to 
the will of the parties in the allocation of jurisdiction within the system of the 
                                                          
Member State has been stressed by the ECJ particularly in its judgment of 13 July 2000,  
C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. v. UGIC, ECR [2000] I-5925 et seq., and the man-
datory nature of the jurisdiction conferred by the Convention has been stressed by its well-
known judgment of 1st March 2005, C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v. N.B. Jackson, trading as 
“Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas” and Others, ECR [2005] I-1383 et seq., where the ECJ 
notably excluded the applicability by a Member State court, namely an English court, of 
domestic rules, materially consisting of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in order to 
grant a stay of proceedings based on a ground of jurisdiction provided by the Brussels 
Convention in favour of a third country court. See, among others, B. AUDIT/ G.A. BERMANN, 
The Application of Private International Norms to “Third Countries”: The Jurisdiction and 
Judgments Example, in A. NUYTS/ N. WATTÉ (eds), International Civil Litigation in Europe 
and Relations With Third States, Brussels 2005, p. 55 et seq., esp. p. 78 et seq.; R. 
FENTIMAN, National Law and the European Jurisdiction Regime, ibidem, p. 83 et seq., esp. 
p. 101 et seq.; Th. KRUGER (note 2), at 265 et seq.; P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES, The 
Mandatory Nature of Article 2 of the Brussels Convention and Derogation from the Rule It 
Lays Down, in P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European 
Judicial Area, Oxford-Portland/ Oregon 2007, p. 101 et seq. 
39 Regarding the effet utile of the rules on jurisdiction as contained in the 1968 
Brussels Convention, the ECJ has held in its judgment of 15 May 1990, case 365/88, 
Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH v. Zeehage BV, ECR [1990] I-1845 et seq., paras 17 et seq., 
that the application of domestic rules concerning admissibility of actions, an issue which is 
not governed by the Convention, though remaining in principle unaffected, may not preju-
dice the effet utile of the Convention, as would be likely to occur in case the application of 
such rules would preclude the application of the rules of jurisdiction contained in the 
Convention. The same rationale applies currently to the Regulation and prospectively to the 
Recast Regulation. 
40 ECJ, Owusu (note 38), esp. at paras 41 et seq.  
41 See, particularly, R. FENTIMAN, Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and 
After?, Common Market Law Review 2006, p. 705 et seq.; Th. KRUGER (note 2), at 234 et 
seq. 
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Regulation itself.42 Following the same line of reasoning, we have proposed else-
where that the power of Member States’ courts vested with jurisdiction under the 
Regulation to stay proceedings and, eventually, to decline jurisdiction due to pro-
ceedings pending before third country courts on the same or related actions pursu-
ant to the domestic rules on lis alibi pendens or related actions before foreign 
courts could not be considered as barred by the position adopted by the ECJ in 
Owusu.43 To reach that conclusion we argued that the rather inflexible solution 
adopted in that case was to be considered as due to the reluctance to accommodate 
the broad degree of flexibility and discretion inherent in the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens within the framework of the Brussels system, strictly inspired as it then 
appeared to certainty and predictability as concerns the establishment of 
jurisdiction.44 
Inevitably, the solution adopted in the Recast Regulation represents a radi-
cal change in the perspective from which the issue had been considered, both 
because it expressly regulates the matter, thus absorbing any residual role which 
domestic rules could have maintained in this respect within the scope of applica-
tion of the Brussels I Regulation, and because it addresses it by resorting to discre-
tionary mechanisms which, as noted already, are in reality very similar to those 
inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens which the ECJ had not too many 
years earlier declared at odds with the rationale of the Brussels system of allocation 
of jurisdiction.45 Leaving this second limb of the issue to some further remarks, 
                                                          
42 Court of Appeal (Civil Division), Konkola Copper Mines v. Coromin, [2006] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 410, confirming High Court of Justice (Queen’s Bench Division), Konkola 
Copper Mines v. Coromin, [2005] EWHC 898 (Comm), summary in Rev. crit. dr. int. pr. 
2006, p. 722 et seq., note H. MUIR-WATT. Such a solution was expressly endorsed by the 
ECJ, prior to the Owusu judgment – in which the Court refrained from returning to the point, 
deeming it irrelevant for the disposal of the case pending before the referring court, where 
no choice of court agreement nor lis alibi pendens was at stake (see paras 47 et seq.) – in its 
earlier judgment of 9 November 2000, C-387/98, Coreck Maritime GmbH v. Handelsveem 
BV, ECR [2000] I-9337 et seq., paras 19 et seq.   
43 See F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 14), at 496 et seq., esp. p. 503 et seq., and 
previously, idem (note 23), at 150 et seq.  
44 Ibidem. See, similarly, G. CUNIBERTI/ M. WINKLER, Note on Cour de justice des 
Communautés européennes, 1er mars 2005, Clunet 2005, p. 1183 et seq., esp. p. 1188 et seq.; 
idem, Forum non conveniens e convenzione di Bruxelles: il caso Owusu dinanzi alla Corte 
di giustizia, Diritto del commercio internazionale 2006, p. 3 et seq., esp. p. 19 et seq.;  
P. FRANZINA, Le condizioni di applicabilità del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 alla luce del 
parere 1/03 della Corte di giustizia, Riv. dir. int. 2006, p. 948 et seq., esp. p. 975 et seq.; a 
more prudent approach was adopted by P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (note 38), at 113 et 
seq., who proposed a discretionary evaluation of the opportunity of staying an action due to 
proceedings pending before a third country court in order to prevent an incentive to forum 
shopping; to the contrary, Th. KRUGER (note 2), at 266 et seq., who prospected the introduc-
tion of an amendment to the Brussels I Regulation in order to expressly provide for the 
applicability of domestic provisions on lis pendens abroad in such cases.  
45 The rationale of the system embodied in the Brussels Convention and subse-
quently in the Brussels I Regulation being indeed that of ensuring certainty and predictabil-
ity as concerns the establishment of jurisdiction, as clearly stressed by the ECJ in its judg-
ment in the Owusu case (note 38), esp. at paras 38 et seq. See on this point, among others, 
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which we shall make later on, it is to be observed that domestic rules concerning lis 
alibi pendens or related actions pending before foreign courts will see their scope 
of application inevitably narrowed down to those sole cases which are not subject 
to the Recast Regulation since, within the scope of application of the latter, the 
matter will be entirely dealt with by either Article 33 or 34 of the Regulation.46 
As noted already,47 the rules as introduced by the Recast Regulation in 
respect of lis alibi pendens and related actions pending before third country courts 
leave one aspect of the application of the new rules for the Member States to regu-
late: the relevant regime of applicability. In fact, both rules, though providing for a 
default regime applicable in the absence of any domestic rule in the sense of 
allowing the applicability of either rule ex parte only, leave it open for the Member 
States to provide in their domestic law for the same rules to be applicable ex 
officio. The rule as formulated in the same terms under Articles 33(4) and 34(4) of 
the Recast Regulation actually leaves open the question of whether Member States 
are considered as expected to adopt, in case they wish to provide for the said rules 
to be applicable ex officio, specific implementing provisions or whether reference 
may be made, by analogy, to the regime of applicability of the corresponding rules 
existing in the domestic law of the Member States on lis alibi pendens or related 
actions pending before a foreign court. In this respect, the Recast Regulation 
contains no provision vesting the Member States with the responsibility to adopt 
specific provisions implementing the Recast Regulation for this specific purpose. 
                                                          
A. DICKINSON, Legal certainty and the Brussels Convention: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 
in P. DE VAREILLES-SOMMIÈRES (ed.), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area,  
Oxford-Portland/ Oregon 2007, p. 115 et seq.; P. MAYER, Forum non conveniens et applica-
tion uniforme des règles de competence, ibidem, p. 137 et seq.; G.P. ROMANO, Principe de 
sécurité juridique, système de Bruxelles I/Lugano et quelques arrêts récents de la CJCE, in 
A. BONOMI/ E. CASHIN RITAINE/ G.P. ROMANO (eds), La Convention de Lugano. Passé, 
présent et dévenir, Zürich 2007, p. 165 et seq., esp. p. 182 et seq.; idem, Le principe de 
sécurité juridique, à l’épreuve des arrêts Gasser et Owusu, Cahiers de droit européen 2008, 
p. 175 et seq., esp. p. 185 et seq.; lastly, C.M. MARIOTTINI, The Proposed Recast of the 
Brussels I Regulation and Forum non conveniens in the European Union Judicial Area, in  
F. POCAR/ I. VIARENGO/ F.C. VILLATA (eds), Recasting Brussels I, Padua 2012, p. 285 et 
seq., esp. p. 287 et seq.   
46 Indeed, with regard to actions not falling within the scope of application ratione 
materiae of the Recast Regulation, the issue of compatibility of the recourse to the domestic 
rules concerning lis alibi pendens or related actions pending abroad will not even come for 
consideration, since those actions are entirely subject to the domestic rules of jurisdiction. 
The problem addressed above (note 37 et seq.) could still be posed as concerns the applica-
bility of domestic provisions on lis pendens and related actions pending abroad with respect 
to an action pending before a third country court whenever the action falls within the scope 
of application of other regulations bearing uniform rules on jurisdiction without expressly 
regulating the issue of lis pendens or related actions pending before a third country court, as 
in cases falling within the scope of application of the Brussels II-bis Regulation,  
No. 2201/2003, or the Maintenance Regulation, No. 4/2009, or, lastly, of the Succession 
Regulation, No. 650/2012, unless provisions comparable to Arts 33 and 34 of the Recast 
Regulation are introduced in those regulations as well, as might be advisable in order to 
ensure uniformity within the European jurisdiction regime.  
47 Supra III., note 19. 
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Therefore, an interpretation of the rule as referring to the solutions ordinarily 
contemplated in respect of the corresponding domestic rules would present the 
advantage of simplicity and of uniformity as concerns the attitude adopted within 
the same Member State regarding actions pending before a third country court. 
This would imply a corresponding treatment in this regard for situations falling 
under the new rules contained in the Recast Regulation and cases subject to the 
residually applicable domestic rules. Furthermore, such a solution would preserve 
an albeit limited scope of application for the relevant domestic rules within the 
scope of application of the Regulation, which would otherwise be excluded alto-
gether. Such a consequence would likely appear disproportionate with respect to 
the fact that domestic rules continue to regulate, instead, the recognition of the 
judgments to be delivered by the third country courts seized of the concurrent 
actions. It is nonetheless to be conceded that, within the currently broad and diver-
sified context of the Member States, it may not always prove easy for subjects 
located in a third country to identify the relevant domestic rules to be applied by 
analogy, and these, furthermore, may not expressly regulate the matter, leaving it 
to case law which may not always appear consistent.48 
 
 
 
VII. Final Remarks: The New Rules as a Revival of the 
Long-Standing Opposition between Certainty and 
Flexibility in the Allocation of Jurisdiction  
The solution as embodied in Articles 33 and 34 of the Recast Regulation, although 
not devoid of difficulties and uncertainties regarding its prospective application, is 
to be considered as a significant innovation within the Brussels system of alloca-
tion of jurisdiction, in a twofold perspective. 
From the one side, it represents a welcome, though incomplete, overcoming 
of the traditional, rigid inter partes approach which had inspired that system from 
the very moment when the Brussels Convention of 1968 had been conceived, and 
when the limits of a system artificially tending to isolate the relationships between 
the Member States from those with the rest of the world were probably less 
                                                          
48 For example, under Italian law, Art. 7(1) of law No. 218/1995, providing for the 
reform of the Italian system of private international law, apparently provides for the rule on 
lis alibi pendens in respect of proceedings pending before a foreign court to be applied ex 
parte, as should be clear from the wording of the provision (“Quando, (…), sia eccepita…”) 
and as was confirmed by the earlier case law: see C. CONSOLO (note 23), esp. at  51 et seq.; 
R. MARENGO (note 23), at 165 et seq.; F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 222 et seq. 
Recently, however, the Italian Court of Cassation (sez. un. civ.), 28 November 2012,  
No. 21108, Riv. dir. int. priv. proc. 2013, p. 762 et seq., critically commented by S.A. 
VILLATA, Sulla nozione e sulla rilevabilità d’ufficio della litispendenza internazionale nella 
l. 218/1995, Rivista di diritto processuale 2013, p. 1574 et seq., esp. p. 1583 et seq., has 
unpersuasively changed its initial position, admitting the application of the rule ex officio, 
though posing on the interested party, pursuant to a general rule, the burden of allegation of 
the relevant circumstances of fact.  
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resented. As noted already, the fact of taking into account the event of proceedings 
pending before a third country court on either the same or on related actions over-
comes to a certain extent such a limit and reflects realistically the perspective of 
judgments to be delivered by third country courts in such actions to be recognised 
and enforced in the Member States, albeit still pursuant to their respective domestic 
rules.49 
From the other side, the solution adopted, in providing a different and less 
automatic treatment of the situation of parallel actions pending before third country 
courts than that provided for in respect of actions pending before other Member 
States’ courts, inevitably reflects the underlined differences in the relevant contexts 
and perspectives from which the two sets of rules are deemed to operate. What 
inevitably appears striking in the solution adopted by the Recast Regulation is that, 
in addressing the said difference, the Regulation has not simply chosen to provide 
for additional requirements for the granting of a stay of proceedings and eventually 
for declining jurisdiction in presence of parallel proceedings on either the same or 
related actions pending before a third country court. In reality, the Recast Regula-
tion conveys the impression of having adopted a different technique in addressing 
such situations, based to a large extent on the exercise by the Member States’ 
courts of the same sort of discretion which the ECJ had expressly declared to be 
alien to the Brussels system of allocation of jurisdiction.50 
Ultimately, it is just as if the EU legislator had overcome the position 
adopted by the ECJ in its case law. The Court, in fact, had found in Owusu the 
discretion inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens incompatible with the 
basic principles of legal certainty and predictability in the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the courts of the Member States, as distinctive of the system enshrined in the 
Brussels Convention first and then in the Brussels I Regulation. In substance, dis-
cretion appears to have been officially accepted, after some breakthroughs in other 
EU acts adopted in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters, among the 
tools of which the Member States’ courts may avail themselves in applying the 
rules embodied in the system. This, nonetheless, happens so far only in respect of 
situations connected with third countries.51 Inevitably, although the conceptual 
                                                          
49 As expressly admitted by Article 34(4) Brussels I Regulation, and, accordingly, by 
Article 45(1)(d), of the Recast Regulation, which provide that an earlier judgment on the 
same cause of action and between the same parties delivered in a third country and enforce-
able in the Member State requested constitutes a ground for refusal of recognition of a 
judgment delivered by another Member State’s courts: supra II. See on the desirability of 
introducing uniform rules concerning the recognition of third country judgments in the 
Member States in order to prevent the risk of diverging outcomes and the incentive to forum 
shopping inherent in the coexistence of different national standards, S.M. CARBONE, (note 
21), p. 301 et seq. 
50 ECJ, Owusu (note 38), at paras 41 et seq. See also supra VI., note 38 et seq. 
51 Actually, some earlier examples of a reception of a discretionary method of 
regulating the relationships among competing jurisdictions which could be considered as 
inspired by the forum non conveniens model are to be found, even though in the distinct 
sphere of the relationships among courts sitting in different Member States only, in Article 
15 of EC Regulation No. 2201/2003, s. c. Brussels II-bis, providing for the referral of 
actions in matters of parental responsibility to the courts of another Member State presenting 
a close connection with the minor, provided such a transfer is suitable for the superior 
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obstacles which have made difficult the reception of legal institutions deriving 
from the common law world in a system strictly inspired to the civil law tradition 
are apparently removed, the practical difficulties remain. In fact, one thing is to 
allow courts belonging to the common law tradition to apply the instruments to 
which they are familiar, another matter is to provide that also other Member States’ 
courts are to embark in exercises to which they are not acquainted. Even if 
reasonable preoccupations may lie behind the requirements concerning 
proceedings pending before third country courts, uncertainty and vagueness 
remains in the wording of some of the requirements for the granting of a stay due 
to lis alibi pendens or a related action pending before a third country court. In 
particular, it may prove difficult to identify the grounds on which the Member 
State court seized is to decide that the granting of stay is necessary for the correct 
administration of justice. One may wonder whether merely procedural 
considerations may come into account in that respect, or whether substantial ones, 
pertaining for example to the material result which is likely to be achieved in the 
proceedings pending before the third country court may also come into account in 
the balance which the court seized is expected to strike among the relevant 
circumstances of the case. In this respect, it is inevitable to observe that the taking 
into consideration of aspects pertaining to the substance of the case would imply 
attributing relevance also to the law to be applied by the third country court in the 
adjudication of the case. Such law will inevitably be determined pursuant to the 
private international law rules applicable in the third country concerned, which, as 
such, is not involved in the process of unification of such rules ongoing at EU 
level. In these terms, the application of the rules on lis pendens and related actions 
in respect of proceedings pending before third country courts as introduced by the 
Recast Regulation might operate as an instrument of coordination, albeit unilateral, 
between the evolving European system of private international law and third 
countries’ conflict of laws systems.52 
Nonetheless, the Recast Regulation, no different from a practice which 
appears frequently followed by recent EU legislation in the field concerned,53 pro-
                                                          
interest of the latter; as well as, more recently, in Article 6 of Regulation (EU) No. 650/2012 
in matters of succession, which, in case of choice of law, allows the court seized pursuant to 
the rules of jurisdiction contained in the Regulation to decline jurisdiction in favour of the 
courts of the Member State of the chosen law, if it deems that those courts are in a better 
position to rule on the succession taking account of the circumstances of the case. Cf., with 
regard to the former, F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 476 et seq.; idem (note 9), at 
359, in note; J. WEBER (note 1), at 636 et seq.; C.M. MARIOTTINI (note 45), at 294 et seq.; 
concerning the latter, A. DAVÌ/ A. ZANOBETTI (note 8), at 118 et seq.; C.M. MARIOTTINI, 
ibidem. 
52 For some considerations regarding lis alibi pendens, conceived as a means of 
opening to a coordination among different systems of private international law, see  
F. MARONGIU BUONAIUTI (note 23), at 44 et seq.; idem (note 14), at 500; previously, among 
others, P. PICONE, Les méthodes de coordination entre ordres juridiques en droit interna-
tional privé, Recueil des Cours vol. 276 (1999), p. 9 et seq., esp. p. 259 et seq.;  
A. NUYTS, L’exception de forum non conveniens (note 25), at 850 et seq.  
53 See, for some remarks concerning the massive and probably inappropriate 
recourse to statements contained in the recitals of the preambles to supplement the provi-
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vides some indications in this respect within a recital in the Preamble, by itself 
devoid of any binding effect. In the said recital, the Preamble states that the 
Member State court should consider all the circumstances of the case pending 
before it. Such a statement, suggesting an inclusive rather than an exclusive 
approach, is followed by some indications, all of which are actually pertaining to 
the procedural sphere, such as the connections existing between the facts of the 
case and the parties and the third country concerned, the state of progress of the 
proceedings in the third country court when the issue comes for consideration, and 
the likelihood of the proceedings before the latter court to be concluded in a timely 
manner.54 
Inevitably, there is a risk that such broad discretion conferred upon the 
Member States courts by the Recast Regulation is actually exercised differently by 
courts sitting in different Member States belonging to heterogeneous legal tradi-
tions, and therefore threatens the Regulation’s objective of uniformity. The debate 
which the ECJ in Owusu seemed to have closed is thus revived by the Recast 
Regulation. Certainty vs. flexibility as the prevailing aim of a system of allocation 
of jurisdiction was the crucial issue raised by the earlier works commenting on the 
effects which the application of traditional institutions of the common law, such as 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, could have on the system of distribution of 
jurisdiction among the courts of different Member States contained in the Brussels 
Convention.55 The same issue is indeed still present behind the competing needs to 
preserve the integrity and continuity of the Brussels system of jurisdiction and to 
provide for its prudent opening to the outer world.56 
                                                          
sions contained in the text of EU Regulations adopted in the field of private international 
law, A. DAVÌ/ A. ZANOBETTI (note 8), at 17, in note. 
54 Preamble, Recital No. 24. 
55 See comments by H. DUINTJER TEBBENS (note 37), at 47 et seq. and  
H. GAUDEMET-TALLON (note 37), at 491 et seq. on the English Court of Appeal judgment in 
the case of In Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd, cit. (supra, note 37) which had admitted the 
possibility of the English courts vested with jurisdiction under the Brussels Convention to 
decline jurisdiction in favour of a third country court on forum non conveniens grounds. 
56 See, among other more recent comments on the said issue following the ECJ judg-
ment in the Owusu case, from different perspectives, A. DICKINSON (note 45), at 115 et seq.; 
P. MAYER (note 45), at 137 et seq.; G.P. ROMANO (note 45), at 182 et seq.; idem (note 45), at 
185 et seq.; C.M. MARIOTTINI (note 45), at 287 et seq. 
